Given a propositional theory T and a proposition q, a su cient condition of q is one that will make q true under T , and a necessary condition of q is one that has to be true for q to be true under T . In this paper, we propose a notion of strongest necessary and weakest su cient conditions. Intuitively, the strongest necessary condition of a proposition is the most general consequence that we can deduce from the proposition under the given theory, and the weakest su cient condition is the most general abduction that we can make from the proposition under the given theory. We show that these two conditions are dual ones, and can be naturally extended to arbitrary formulas. We investigate some computational properties of these two conditions and discuss some of their potential applications.
Introduction
Given a propositional theory T and a proposition q, a su cient condition of q is one that will make q true under T: T j = q. Symmetrically, a necessary condition of q is one that has to be true for q to be true under T: T j = q .
For instance, consider the following theory T: rain grassWet; sprinklerOn grassWet: A su cient condition for grassWet to be true under T is for rain to be true. Another (trivial) one is grassWet itself. Yet another one is sprinklerOn. And yet another one is rain _ sprinklerOn.
In this paper we shall propose a notion of weakest su cient and strongest necessary conditions, study their properties, and consider ways of computing them. There are many potential applications. The following are two examples:
An earlier version of this paper appeared in the Proceedings of KR2000, and was selected as the co-winner of the Best Paper Awards.
Abduction As we can see from the above example, given an observation, there may be more than one abductive conclusions that we can draw. It should be useful to nd the weakest of such conclusions, i.e. the weakest su cient condition of the observation.
De nability It is often necessary to determine whether a given theory yields a de nition of a proposition in terms of a set of other propositions. For example, such computation is essential in both Simon's 17] and Pearl's 14] approaches to causation. This is also what is needed in order to compute successor state axioms 15] from causal theories. As we shall see, the problem of whether a proposition can be de ned in terms of other propositions, and if so, nding an explicit de nition of this proposition can be reduced to that of computing the two conditions that we shall propose in this paper. Furthermore, we believe de nability is best handled using these two conditions. While a proposition may or may not be de nable in terms of a set of base propositions, our strongest necessary and weakest su cient conditions, as we shall show, always exist and are unique up to logical equivalence under the given theory. Furthermore, these two conditions are useful to have even when a proposition cannot be de ned in terms of others. For instance, in the context of reasoning about actions, this situation arises when an action has an indeterminate e ect on a proposition. In this case, the strongest necessary and weakest su cient conditions of this proposition can be used to completely capture the e ect of this action on the proposition. This paper is organized as follows. We include logical preliminaries in section 2. In section 3, we de ne the notion of strongest necessary and weakest su cient conditions, and prove some results that characterize these conditions. In section 4, we extend these two conditions to that of arbitrary formulas. In Section 5 we outline some algorithms for computing these two conditions and discuss some experimental results. In section 6, we discuss some related work, and nally in section 7, we conclude this paper.
Logical preliminaries
We assume a propositional language. As usual, a truth assignment is a function from the set of propositions in the language to ftrue; falseg, and the satis ability relation M j = ' is de ned as usual between a truth assignment M and a formula '.
Given a set P of propositions, a formula that mentions only propositions in P is called a formula of P. It is clear that the truth value of such a formula is determined by the truth values of the propositions in P only.
Given a formula ', and a proposition p, we denote by '(p=true) the result of replacing every p in ' by true. We extend this notation to a set of formulas A notion of forgetting, or eliminations of \middle terms" as Boole ( 2] , page 99) called it, will be essential here. Given a formula ', and a proposition p, the result of forgetting p in ', written forget('; p), is the following formula:
Now given a nite set of propositions P, the result of forgetting P in ', written forget('; P), is de ned inductively as:
forget('; ;) = '; forget('; P fqg) = forget(forget('; q); P):
It can be shown that for any formula ' and any propositions p 1 and p 2 , forget(forget('; p 1 ); p 2 ) and forget(forget('; p 2 ); p 1 ) are equivalent. So forget('; P) is well de ned.
Since Boole 2] rst de ned it in 1854, this notion of forgetting, or eliminations of middle terms, has been re-discovered several times. For instance, Weber 19] re-introduced it and used it for updating propositional knowledge bases. It is also a special case of a more general notion of forgetting de ned on rst-order languages by Lin and Reiter 12] for capturing database progression 11] and certain notions of relevance in problem solving. Lewis 8] (page 155) observed that \For purposes of application of the algebra 1 to ordinary reasoning, elimination is a process more important than solution, since most processes of reasoning take place through the elimination of`middle' terms." As we shall see, this notion of \the elimination of middle terms" is certainly central for us here.
The following lemma is entailed by Proposition 3 in (Lin and Reiter 12]), and will play an important role in this paper.
Lemma 1 For any formula ' and any set P of propositions, if does not mention any propositions in P, then ' j = , forget('; P) j = : In particular, we have that ' j = forget('; P).
3 Strongest necessary and weakest su cient conditions
We begin with strongest necessary conditions. As we shall see, weakest su cient conditions are dual ones. 1 The author's note: \the algebra" = Boolean algebra as we know it today.
De nition 1 Let T be a theory, P a set of propositions in T, and q a proposition in T but not in P. A formula ' of P is said to be a necessary condition of q on P under T if T j = q '. It is said to be a strongest necessary condition if it is a necessary condition, and for any other necessary condition ' 0 , we have
In this paper, both the background theory T and the base set P of propositions are assumed to be nite. The following proposition is straightforward: Another one is true. Of course, T 3 j = p 1 true.
The following theorem captures this notion of strongest necessary conditions in terms of truth assignments. It says that a necessary condition ' of q is a strongest one on P if and only if for any model of T, if it satis es ', then it can be modi ed into a model of q without changing the truth values of the propositions in P:
Theorem 1 Let T, P, and q be as in De nition 1. Let ' be a necessary condition of q on P under T. Then ' is a strongest necessary condition of q on P under T i for any model M of T and ', there is an assignment M 0 such that: Notice that it is essential that the formula ' in Theorem 1 be a necessary condition of q. Otherwise, we could always let ' be false.
We can use this theorem to verify that a certain necessary condition is in fact the strongest. For instance, consider T 1 = fq p 1^p2 g in Example 1 above. Clearly, p 1 is a necessary condition of q on fp 1 g. It's a strongest one because given any model of T 1 , if it satis es p 1 , then we can modify it into another model of T 1 and q while preserving the truth value of p 1 . However, although it is also a necessary condition of q on fp 1 ; p 2 g, it is not the strongest one this time, because if M j = p 1^: p 2^: q, then M j = T 1 fp 1 g, but it cannot be modi ed into a model of q and T 1 without changing the truth value of p 2 . We can similarly de ne the notion of weakest su cient conditions:
De nition 2 Let T be a theory, P a set of propositions in T, and q a proposition in T but not in P. A formula of P is said to be a su cient condition of q on P under T if T j = q. It is said to be a weakest su cient condition if it is a su cient condition, and for any other su cient condition Strongest necessary and weakest su cient conditions are in fact dual conditions. The easiest way to make this dual relationship precise is to extend these conditions from propositions to arbitrary formulas and to show that for any formula A, a formula ' is a strongest necessary (weakest su cient) condition of A i :' is a weakest su cient (strongest necessary) condition of :A. This will be done in section 4.
We now relate these two conditions to the notion of de nability. We say that a theory T de nes a proposition q on a set P of propositions i there is a formula ' of P such that T j = q '. The following proposition is straightforward: Proposition 2 A theory T de nes a proposition q on P i T j = ' , where ' is any strongest necessary condition of q on P and any weakest su cient condition of q on P, both under the theory T.
Notice that when the condition T j = ' holds, we have that T j = ' and T j = q '. So this proposition reduces the problem of computing de nability to that of computing strongest necessary and weakest su cient conditions. An advantage of working with the latter is that the two conditions always exist and are unique up to logical equivalence under any given theory. Furthermore, they are useful to have even when they do not yield a de nition of a proposition. For instance, in logic of programs, Dijkstra's notion of weakest preconditions is a special case of our notion of weakest su cient conditions, and as shown in 1, 6] , these conditions provide a good way to reason about the indeterminate e ects of actions for which successor state axioms (de nitions) do not exist. 4 Strongest necessary and weakest su cient conditions of a formula
Our notion of strongest necessary and weakest su cient conditions can be extended from a proposition to an arbitrary formula.
De nition 3 Let T be a propositional theory, a formula, and P a set of propositions in T f g. A formula ' of P is said to be a necessary condition of on P i T j = '. It is said to be a strongest necessary condition if for any other necessary condition ' 0 , we have that T j = ' ' 0 . Su cient conditions and weakest su cient conditions are de ned similarly.
Computing the strongest necessary and the weakest su cient conditions of a formula can be reduced to that of a proposition, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 3 Let T, P, and be as in De nition 3. A formula ' of P is the strongest necessary (weakest su cient) condition of on P under the theory T i it is the strongest necessary (weakest su cient) condition of q on P under the theory T 0 = T fq g, where q is a new proposition not in T and . Proof: We prove this for SNC. The case for WSC is similar. The "if" part:
suppose ' is the SNC of . We show that it is also an SNC of q under T Although not necessary in principle, the notion of su cient and necessary conditions of a formula is very useful in expressing many properties. The following are some interesting ones.
The rst one says that, as expected, if two formulas are equivalent under T, then they have the same strongest necessary and weakest su cient conditions: Proposition 4 If T j = , then for any set of propositions P, a formula ' is a strongest necessary (weakest su cient) condition of on P i it is a strongest necessary (weakest su cient) condition of on P.
Proof: Suppose ' is the SNC of on P under T. Then it is NC of as well. . Therefore ' is also an SNC of on P. The proof that if ' is an SNC of , then it is also an SNC of is symmetric.
The proof for WSC is similar.
The following proposition makes precise the dual relation between strongest necessary and weakest su cient conditions:
Proposition 5 A formula ' is the strongest necessary (weakest su cient) condition of q i :' is the weakest su cient (strongest necessary) condition of :q, where all the conditions are on a common set of propositions and under a common theory.
Proof: Suppose ' is the SNC of q. Then T j = q '. Thus T j = :' :q. Proof: First of all, ' is an NC: T j = '. We show that it is the SNC using This proposition is particularly useful in planning when we do not have a successor state axiom for every uent: given a conjunctive goal g 1^ ^g n , to achieve it using action A, we need to compute the weakest su cient condition of this conjunction, and reduce the conjunctive goal to it. By this proposition, instead of having to compute the weakest su cient condition for every possible conjunction, it is enough to compute the condition for each conjunct ahead of time.
5 Computing strongest necessary and weakest su cient conditions
There are several ways to compute these two conditions. We begin with prime implicates 18]. As with most reasoning tasks, strongest necessary and weakest su cient conditions can be easily computed using prime implicates.
Proposition 8 Let T be a theory, q a proposition, and P a set of propositions.
Let be the set of prime implicates of T that mention only propositions in P fqg.
1. The strongest necessary condition of q on P under T is equivalent to the following conjunction:^f C j :q _ C 2 g;
where if there is no such prime implicate in , then the conjunction is considered to be true, and if :q 2 , then the conjunction is considered to be false. 2. The weakest su cient condition of q on P under T is equivalent to the following disjunction: _ f:C j q _ C 2 g; where if there is no such prime implicate in , then the disjunction is considered to be false, and if q 2 , then the conjunction is considered to be true.
Proof: We prove this proposition for SNC. Let W be the conjunction in the proposition. Clearly, T j = q W, so W is an NC. Now let be any other NC: T j = q , and ? the set of prime implicates of . Since does not mention q, the following set ? 0 = f:q _ C j C 2 ?g is the set of prime implicates of q , where if C = true (i.e., is a tautology), then :q _ C is true, and if C = false (i.e., is not satis able), then :q _ C is :q. Therefore for each :q _ C in ? However, computing the strongest necessary (similarly weakest su cient) condition of a proposition using prime implicates is almost always a bad idea, unless one wants these conditions for all propositions on all possible sets of propositions and wants them in the form of prime implicates. This is because, in general, there is no viable way of computing the set in Proposition 8 short of computing the set of all prime implicates of a theory. But once having the set of prime implicates, one can just \read" out these two conditions for any proposition using Proposition 8.
Nevertheless, Proposition 8 is interesting in that it relates our notion of weakest su cient conditions to Reiter proposition, for any theory T, and proposition q, if P is the set of propositions that are in T but di erent than q, then the weakest su cient condition of a q on P under T is equivalent to the disjunction of the negation of each minimal support clause for q with respect to T.
However, our two conditions are de ned independent of prime implicates. In fact, a better way of computing them is in terms of the notion of forgetting that we de ned in Section 2, by using the following theorem: 2 Theorem 2 Let T be a theory, P a set of propositions, and q a proposition in T but not in P. Let We illustrate the use of this theorem using the following theory T = fq p 1 _ p 2 g: According to the theorem, the strongest necessary condition of q on fp 1 ; p 2 g is forget(T(q=true); ;), which is T(q=true) and equivalent to p 1 _ p 2 , the same as given in Example 1. The strongest necessary condition of q on fp 1 g is forget(T(q=true); fp 2 g), which is equivalent to forget(p 1 _ p 2 ; fp 2 g), which by de nition is (p 1 _ true) _ (p 1 _ false), thus equivalent to true.
By its de nition, for any formula ' and proposition p, forget('; p) returns a formula that is twice the size as that of '; and for a set P of propositions, forget('; P) returns a formula whose size is 2 n times the size of ', where n is the size of P. Indeed, computing forgetting in the worst case is expensive. For instance, it is easy to see that a formula is satis able i forgetting all propositions in it returns true, and a formula is not satis able i forgetting all propositions in it returns false. However, forget('; p) can often be simpli ed. For instance, if ' is in disjunctive normal form, then forget('; p) can be computed e ciently to yield a formula that is shorter than ': it is the result of replacing both p and :p in ' by true. More generally, as Darwiche 5] showed, if ' is what he called decomposable negation normal form, then forget('; p) can be computed e ciently.
In this paper, we consider two ways of computing forgetting: directly using its de nition or through (again) prime implicates. They are embodied below as Algorithms 1 and 2 for computing strongest necessary conditions. The ones for weakest su cient conditions are similar.
Input A set T of axioms, a set P of propositions, and a proposition q not in P. Output A formula of P that is the strongest necessary condition of q on P under T. 4. Transform C(p=true) _ C(p=false) into a minimal set of clauses, assign it to C, and go back to step 3. 5. Post-processing: although the resulting C is a strongest necessary condition of q, it is often an unwieldy set of clauses; it can be simpli ed as follows: eliminate those clauses in C that are subsumed by one of the clauses in C 0 ;
for each clause in C, transform (C ? f g) C 0 into a minimal set of clauses C , and eliminate from C if it is subsumed by one of the clauses in C . Where a minimal set of clauses is one such that: all unit clauses are resolved; none of the clauses is subsumed by any other clause in the set. Our experience with this algorithm has been that it spends the bulk of the time on computing minimal sets of clauses in step 4. But if we do not require a set of clauses to be minimal, then the program quickly runs out of space.
Notice that according to our de nition, for a set of clauses C to be a minimal one, only unit clauses in it need to be resolved. So our notion of minimality is much weaker than that of prime implicates. For comparison, let us consider computing forgetting using prime implicates.
The following algorithm makes use of the fact that for any ' and P, forget('; P) is equivalent to the conjunction of prime implicates of ' that do not mention any propositions in P.
Algorithm 2
1. Let T 1 = f' j ' 2 T is a sentence of Pg, and T 2 = T ? T1. Transform T 1 into a minimal set of clauses C 0 . 2. Generate the prime implicates of T 2 (q=true) using Tison's procedure 18], and let C be the set of those prime implicates that mention only propositions in P. 3. Go to post-processing as in Algorithm 1. We have implemented the above two algorithms in SWI-Prolog 3 , and run them on both random 3CNFs 4 and action theories used for computing successor state axioms in various action domains 10]. It turned out that Algorithm 2 is always slower than Algorithm 1, with on average a slow down of between 10 to 15 times. The reason is that computing prime implicates is expensive. Our notion of minimal sets of clauses seems to serve our purpose well here in cutting down the number and sizes of clauses without incurring too much overhead in computing them.
Notice that in step 4 of Algorithm 1, after we have chosen a proposition to forget, we compute immediately the result of forgetting this proposition, C(p=true) _ C(p=false), by a set of minimal clauses. This is like breadth-rst search, and as we have mentioned, is the bottleneck of this algorithm. Alternatively, we could work on each disjunct separately, and compute disjunctions only after all those propositions that need to be forgotten have been eliminated. As it turned out, this variant of Algorithm 1 performed far better than Algorithm 1 on random 3CNFs. For random 3CNFs with 50 variables and 215 clauses, this variant of Algorithm 1 spent on average 15 minutes 5 to return a strongest necessary condition of a proposition on a set of 10 other propositions, while Algorithm 1 did not return a solution after running overnight. However, this variant of Algorithm 1 is about 20% slower on action theories. The key is with the disjunction C(p=true) _ C(p=false): it can be simpli ed a lot for many benchmark action theories, but not much for random theories.
Regardless of which approach one uses, we have found that sometimes, it is a lot easier to compute the strongest necessary condition than the weakest su cient condition, and sometimes, it is the other way around. For instance, we have found that for many action theories, strongest necessary conditions are a lot easier to compute than weakest su cient conditions. When one condition is much easier to compute, the following proposition will be very useful in computing the other one.
Proposition 9 Let T be a theory, q a proposition, and P a set of propositions.
1. If ' is a necessary condition of q on P under T, and a weakest su cient condition of q on P under T f'g, then '^ is a weakest su cient condition of q on P under T. 2. If is a su cient condition of q on P under T, and ' a strongest necessary condition of q on P under T f: g, then ' _ is a strongest necessary condition of q on P under T.
Proof: We illustrate this phenomenon for the problem of generating successor state axioms in a robot domain. To simplify our presentation, we assume that there is just one object in this domain, and the robot can carry the object around by moving from one location to another. Now suppose that move(1; 2) stands for the action that the robot moves from location 1 to location 2, and that we have the following propositions:
at i -initially, the object is at location i, for each location i. at1 i -after the action move(1; 2), the object is at location i. atR i -initially, the robot is at location i. atR1 i -after the action, the robot is at location i. h -initially, the robot is holding the object.
h1 -after the action, the robot is holding the object. The background theory is then the following set of axioms: where the disjunctions are ranged over all locations. These axioms are generated from the direct e ect action axiom: after move(1; 2), the robot will be at location 2, and domain constraints such as \the object and the robot can be at only one location at any given time" and \if the robot is holding the object, then the robot and the object are always at the same location" using a predicate completion procedure in 9]. More details about this procedure, and the way the above axioms are generated from a causal theory can be found in (Lin 10] ). Now let q be at1 2 , and P the set of propositions about the initial situation: P = fhg fat i j i is a locationg fatR i j i is a locationg:
Then the weakest su cient condition of q on P is the weakest condition about the initial situation that would ensure that the package is at location 2 after the action is performed, and the strongest necessary condition is the strongest conclusion that one can infer about the initial situation once one knows that the package is at location 2 after the action is performed. Figure 1 compares the performance of computing the weakest su cient condition of q on P using Algorithm 1 with or without the aid of Proposition 9. In the gure, the x-axis is the number of locations, and y-axis the CPU run time in seconds on a SPARC Ultra 2. The line labeled by snc corresponds to the strongest necessary condition of q on P, 6 the one labeled by wsc the weakest su cient condition of q on P, 7 and wsc1 the weakest su cient condition of q on P once the strongest su cient condition has been added to the theory 8 according to Proposition 9. The speedup of wsc1 over wsc is quite obvious, and similar speedup is also achieved for other propositions and other action domains that we have experimented with, which include most of the benchmark planning domain in McDermott's PDDL library 13]. 6 For which the program outputs h _ at 2 no matter how many locations there are in the domain. 7 For which the program outputs h _ at 2 . 8 For which the program outputs true. Our notion of strongest necessary and weakest su cient conditions bear structural resemblance to Dijkstra's notion of strongest postconditions and weakest preconditions of programs (cf. 6]). However, Dijkstra was mainly concerned about compositional rules of these conditions over program operators, once these conditions are given for basic assignment statements. In contrast, our study of these two conditions are completely general. Even in applications to computing the e ects of actions, our concerns for these two conditions di er from that of Dijkstra, and similarly recent applications of Dijkstra's notion to reasoning about action by Bj areland and Karlsson ( 1] ), in that we are interested in computing the e ect of primitive actions from a set of direct e ect axioms and causal rules. Our notion of weakest su cient conditions is closely related to abduction and diagnosis. We have mentioned the relationship between our weakest su cient conditions and Reiter and de Kleer's minimal support clauses. In general, we are interested here in logical formulas that capture all possible explanations without committing ourself into the exact formats that these formulas ought to have, while much of the work on abduction and diagnosis has been model-based, and mainly concerned with computing parsimonious and minimal explanations.
However, there are some exceptions. In logic programming, Console et al. ( 3] ) investigated abduction through deduction through the Clark completion of a logic program. They de ned the explanation formula of an abduction problem to be the most speci c formula in the language of abducible atoms such that the formula is entailed by the completion of the program and the observation. Here the most speci c formula is like our strongest condition, but with a di erence. According to Console et al., a formula ' is more speci c than '
, while for us, this entailment only needs to be true under the given logical theory. This somewhat minor di erence has some far reaching rami cations, as we shall see in connection with a more recent work by Darwiche ( 4] ) who proposed a very similar notion and applied it to diagnosis problems.
Given a theory T, a formula , and a set of propositions P such that none of the propositions in P occur in , Darwiche 4] de ned the consequence of on P to be a formula ' such that T f g j = ', and for any such ' ', then ' is both the strongest necessary and weakest conditions of . But ' may be neither the consequence nor the argument of according to Darwiche's de nitions. Secondly, the post-processing step in Algorithm 1 will not be correct according to Darwiche's de nitions. Perhaps most signi cantly, our Proposition 9 would not be true under Darwiche's de nitions. For instance, consider the theory T = fp q; q :pg. According to Darwiche's de nitions, the consequence of q on fpg w.r.t. T is :p. So for Proposition 9 to hold in Darwiche's framework, the argument of q on fpg w.r.t. T would have to be equivalent to the conjunction of :p and the argument of q on fpg w.r.t. T f:pg. Unfortunately, this is not true, as the conjunction is equivalent to false, which is not the argument of q on fpg w.r.t. T. Notice that false is the weakest su cient condition of q on fpg under T, which means that under no condition on p can q be true as :p is entailed by the theory. This last di erence between our notion and Darwiche's is signi cant as Proposition 9 is the basis of one of the key strategies that we used for computing the weakest su cient conditions in relation to action theories.
Concluding remarks and future work
We have proposed a notion of strongest necessary and weakest su cient conditions of a proposition, and considered ways of computing them. We believe these conditions have many potential applications in various areas including abduction and reasoning about actions.
There are several directions for future work. One of them is to extend the results here to the rst-order case. This can be a di cult task. For instance, a result in 11] shows that forgetting in the rst-order case cannot in general be expressible in rst-order logic. As a consequence, we expect that strongest necessary conditions of a proposition under a rst-order theory cannot in general be expressible in rst-order logic either. It seems that the best hope for dealing with the rst-order case is to rst reduce it to the propositional case, and then try to learn a rst-order description from a set of propositional ones.
